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1.  Introduction 
Agriculture is always the dominant activity in the first stage of economic development 
(up to, say, USD 1000/capita/year).  And in most countries, 80-90% of food is 
produced locally. Apart from the mining sector and extractive industries (e.g. oil 
production), most industrialisation in poor countries (first stage of economic 
development) is agriculturally-led.  Many poor (African) countries with a large 
agricultural sector (30% and more of GDP, 50% and more of employment, 50% and 
more of exports) suffer from widespread food insecurity and hunger.  In these 
countries, agriculture is invariably associated with rural poverty, and there has been a 
failure in agricultural development for several reasons, some of which are explained 
further. 
Agriculture plays a key role in the fulfilment of basic physiological needs (ref. needs 
pyramid of Abraham Maslow).  Hunger and thirst, together with sleep and sex are 
examples of the basic physiological needs.  If the basic physiological needs are not 
fulfilled, violence may result.   Fulfilment of basic physiological needs is a prime 
driver for the survival of the individual.  Threats to survival may easily lead to 
violence and conflict.  The access to adequate food is indivisibly linked to higher 
needs such as human dignity and self-realisation. 
Agriculture, particularly traditional or peasant  agriculture is more than just food 
production for survival.  It is also the essence of livelihood in rural areas, and the 
production aspect ensures livelihood security.  By engagement in agriculture, one 
ensures its entitlement to livelihood security through one's own food production and 
the generation of cash income, which ensures fulfilment of other physiological needs. 
Agricultural production requires resources and the use of these resources.  Together 
with technology and management (decision making), they result in agricultural 
production.  With traditional or unimproved (peasant) technologies, resource 
productivity is very low, resulting in production which barely or not covers 
consumption needs.  This is also the cause of low income, or subsistence income only.  
When in addition to low resource productivity, the amount of resources at hand is 
limited, e.g. through high population density, production does not cover subsistence 
needs (in kind and in cash).  This leads to the struggle for survival, in which access to 
resources plays a crucial role.   5 
An inadequate resource base (land, water, animals, capital) is at the root of many 
violent conflicts.  Lack of enough resources to ensure livelihood survival (entitlement) 
is more and more the result of population growth  and resource degradation.  
Population growth and resource degradation (e.g. declining soil fertility, loss of 
biodiversity, disappearance of fuel wood, …) often go hand in hand, and are linked.  
The most frequent response is rural to urban migration. 
There is strong evidence that lack of agricultural resources and resource degradation 
are the root causes of many violent conflicts in sub-Sahara Africa, e.g. 
- crop failure and the "Ruriganiza" famine in 1989 in Southern Rwanda as a prelude 
to genocide in 1994 (Philip Verwimp, doctoral thesis 2003, K.U.Leuven) - see box 
- competition for grazing land for livestock among pastoralists in Somalia, the basis 
for the existence of tribal warlords and continuing violence and conflicts 
- conflicts over land, and particularly access to land in ethnically mixed societies such 
as density populated Nigeria are a continuous source of violent internal conflicts 
- the recent violent conflict in Ivory Coast, with about 30% of its population having 
come from poor Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Mali), whereby recently titles to 
land are linked to nationality, seems rooted in disputes over access to land resources 
- the on-going conflict in Bunia, Ituri region of R.D. Congo has all the elements of 
the Tutsi-Hutu rivalry in Rwanda with the Hema as the cattle rearing non-Bantu and 
the Lendus as the land tilling Bantu.  Competition for (grazing) land and for 
minerals in the land (gold, coltan) coupled with ethnic divisions and hatred forms 
the bedrock for civil war.  The combatants are mostly irregular militias, their 
victims mostly unarmed and the fighting has gone on for nearly five years since the 
occupying and plundering Ugandan and Rwandan army arrived.  When they 
recently withdrew, the two largest local tribes, the Hema and the Lendus, then 
began to fight for control of resources (power).  
 
2. Conflict, food insecurity and poverty 
According to FAO, World Food Summit - five years later (10-13 June, 2002) - "Food, 
Security, Justice and Peace" paper, there is a well established correlation between the 
exposure of countries to external or internal conflicts, and the deterioration or long-
term stagnation in their food security.  Most conflicts, and especially the internal   6 
conflicts that have now become the dominant model of mass violence, mainly affect 
rural areas and their populations.    The number of food emergencies has tended to 
increase during the latter part of the 1990s, from both natural and human-induced 
factors.  This increase has been associated primarily with a rise of conflicts.  Of the 
1,240 million USD spent by the World Food Programme in 2000 for relief operations 
(98 million USD in 1978), 715 million or 58% were for man-made emergencies in 
support of Internally Displaced Peopled and refugees. 
In all conflicts, smallholder agriculture - the basic livelihood of the rural poor- is 
usually hit the hardest.  They lose the few assets they have and become very 
vulnerable.  Conflict-related agricultural output losses for all developing countries are 
extensive, an average of 4.3 billion USD losses per year over the period 1970-1997 
(FAO-WFS - five years later).  The impact of conflict on food security often lasts long 
after the violence has subsided, because assets have been destroyed, people killed or 
maimed, populations displaced, the environment damaged, and health, education and 
social services shattered.  The worst damage is done by landmines which litter 
agricultural land, and deter people from farming for years.  In both 1980s and 1990s, 
conflict-induced losses in developing countries exceeded the value of total food aid of 
all types to those countries.  In the 1980s they were about $ 37 billion while they were 
$ 29 billion in current prices in the 1990s.  Civil wars and conflicts are thus a major 
cause of development failure in the developing world. 
Sustainable (agricultural) development, by redressing the inner causes that make 
society a fertile terrain for conflict, including food insecurity, poverty and lack of 
human development in its various dimensions, is a building stone for peace.  In most 
instances of conflict and violence, agriculture or food insecurity is not the trigger, but 
rather the social seedbed of violence.  It creates the conditions and environment for 
social upheaval and conflict, but usually does not trigger open conflict.  Sometime 
else, an unfortunate event, an accident, a sudden shock in the social system then 
triggers violence.  Food insecurity creates the chronic condition in which violence can 
occur, but an acute unfortunate event acts as a trigger to unleash the violence.  Such a 
trigger can be any internal or external shocks: drought, pests, migration of people, a 
collapse in cash crop prices, a new (repressive) government policy, etc. 
In R.D. Congo, the "internal" conflict since 1998 has resulted in over 3 million death, 
has destabilized most of Central Africa by drawing - in neighbouring countries, and   7 
has resulted in food insecurity for almost the whole population.  22% of the increase 
in food insecurity in the world over the period 1990-92 to 1997-99 comes from RDC 
(Tollens, 2003).  But the conflict now that lingers on has more to do with access to 
minerals (gold, diamonds, coltan) and pillage of natural resources (timber, 
biodiversity, …), not agriculture per se.  But violence, food insecurity, and internal 
displacement of persons is the major consequence.  
The downturn in world military expenditures that had followed the end of the cold 
war came to an end by 1998.  After a decline of 37%, world military expenditure 
rebounded by 2% in 1999 and 3% in 2000, reaching some $ 800 billion (FAO-WFS - 
5 years later, 2002).  The increase took place in all regions, with Africa and 
South Asia, the poorest regions in the world, registering the steepest increases among 
the developing regions (respectively + 37% and + 23% from 1998 to 2000). 
Of the 56 major armed conflicts registered in the decade 1990-2000, only three were 
of an interstate nature.  The state-against-state model is becoming the exception.  All 
others were internal conflicts, although in 14 of them foreign troops were engaged 
(FAO-WFS  - 5  years later, 2002).  Most contemporary conflicts take place 
overwhelmingly in the world's poorer countries (Africa and Asia).  Civil wars and 
conflicts are a major cause of development failure in the developing world. 
In most internal conflicts, there is collective violence and it is difficult to distinguish 
combatants from civilians.  And civilians are the main victims of the conflict.  And 
intra-state wars always run the risk of becoming interstate (e.g. Ivory Coast, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, R.D. Congo). 
A new study by Paul Collier of the World Bank and others
1, which examines the 
world's civil wars since 1960, concludes that although tribalism is often a factor, it is 
rarely the main one.  Surprisingly, the authors found that societies composed of 
several different ethnic and religious groups were actually less likely to experience 
civil war than homogenous societies. 
However, in multi-ethnic societies where one group forms an absolute majority, the 
risk of war is 50% higher than in societies where this is not the case.  This is perhaps 
                                                 
1  Collier, Paul a.o., 2003, "Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy", Oxford 
University Press, 221 p.; http://econ.worldbank.org/prr/CivilWarPRR/   8 
because minorities fear that even if the country is democratic, they will be 
permanently excluded from power. 
The most striking common factor among war-prone countries is their poverty.  Rich 
countries almost never suffer civil war and middle-income countries rarely.  But the 
poorest one-sixth of humanity endures four-fifths of the world's civil wars. 
The best predictors of conflict are low average incomes, low growth, and a high 
dependence on exports of primary products such as oil or diamonds.  They found that 
when income per person doubles, the risk of civil war halves, and that for each 
percentage point by which the growth rate raises, the risk of conflict falls by a point.  
An otherwise typical country whose exports of primary commodities account for 10% 
of GDP has an 11% chance of being at war.  At 30% of GDP, the risk peaks at about 
one in three. 
Why are poor, stagnant countries so vulnerable?  Partly because it is easy to give a 
poor man a cause.  But also, almost certainly, because poverty and low or negative 
growth are often symptoms of corrupt, incompetent government, which can provoke 
rebellion.  They are also common in immature societies, whose people have not yet 
figured out how to live together. 
Natural resources tend to aggravate these problems.  When a state has oil, its leaders 
can grow rich without bothering to nurture other kinds of economic activity.  Corrupt 
leaders often cement their support base by sharing the loot with their own ethnic 
group, which tends to anger all the other groups. 
Most countries have what Collier calls "ethnic romantics who dream of creating an 
ethnically 'pure' political entity".  If oil is found beneath their home region, their calls 
for secession suddenly start to sound attractive to those who live there, and abhorrent 
to everyone else.  Oil was one reason why Biafra tried to secede from Nigeria, and 
why the Nigerian government fought so hard to prevent it. 
Three sets of problems contribute to the present African predicament: the weakness of 
states, their lack of integration in the new international economy and their lack of 
democracy.  Ideally, donors seeking to help African countries should address all three 
sets of problems at the same time.  In reality, this is not possible because of funding 
and human resource constraints. 
   9 
3.  Livelihood entitlement: the sustainable livelihoods approach 
The sustainable livelihoods approach assumes that increasing access or entitlement to 
capital (or assets) is crucial for ensuring sustainably one's livelihood.  A livelihood is 
defined as comprising "the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of 
living" (Dorward et.al, 2001).  Sustainability is achieved when a livelihood can cope 
with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities 
and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource 
base (Carney, 1998).  It is thus the key to broad-based growth and poverty reduction.  
Assets take many forms, and in the asset based livelihoods approach, five types of 
capital are distinguished: 
- physical capital, e.g. house, tools, cattle 
- natural capital, e.g. land, water, forests 
- financial capital, e.g. money, savings, bonds 
- human capital, e.g. education, health, skills 
- social capital, e.g. member of organizations, family, ethnic group. 
There are strong complementarities among capital categories.  For example, building 
social capital by strengthening farmers' groups and improving road and 
communications networks can enhance the financial asset base.  Secure land use 
rights can allow farmers to invest in technology, leading to higher farm productivity 
and incomes.  They may then invest in improved health and nutrition status and their 
children's education. 
According to the livelihood entitlement approach, assistance must focus on the assets 
of rural poor, enhance them and strengthen them.  Lack of assets is both a symptom 
and cause of poverty.  The poor call upon a range of different assets and activities as 
they seek to sustain and improve their wellbeing.  This includes in particular human 
assets: better rural health training, and education, but also physical assets: rural 
infrastructure development, access to markets, improved soil fertility, access to safe 
water, and increasingly recognized, social capital-access to and the quality of informal 
networks and local organisations.  Social assets, through empowerment, inclusion in 
decision making processes, mutual self-help mechanisms and mutual micro-finance 
are of vital importance in coping with adversity.  And better technology must help to 
increase productivity, reduce risks and enhance the stability of incomes.   10 
Smallholders finance, technology, market organization and access to land and water 
are the classic problems of rural development assistance.  These problems must be 
addressed in a systematic and comprehensive fashion, not haphazard or in isolated 
cases.  Only then can they bear directly on production and income of the rural poor.  
And there is a large role for public sector institutions in this area, by the provision of 
agricultural services such as research, extension, education, micro-finance, 
infrastructure, market organization.  But this needs to be coupled with substantial 
private investment in the agricultural sector - particularly in services, processing and 
trade in order to have large impact.  Thus the investment climate is important, as is 
empowerment. 
Thus, livelihood entitlement, by redressing the inner causes that make society a fertile 
terrain for conflict, including food insecurity, poverty and lack of human 
development, in its various dimensions, is a building stone for peace.  Where 
opportunities are created for a more equal access to physical, natural, financial and 
institutional resources, sustainable livelihoods are possible.  It is obvious, however, 
that sustainable development cannot take place in the midst of actual or potential 
conflict, and that protracted conflicts destroy livelihood entitlement and perpetuate 
poverty.  But in poor countries, agriculture is invariably the lynch pin of livelihood 
entitlement and economic development. 
 
4.  Agricultural growth, comparative advantage, stage of development and 
industrialisation 
Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa are rich in agricultural resources - they have 
substantial natural assets for agriculture and have a definite comparative advantage in 
the agricultural sector.  This depends very much on the stage of  economic 
development as comparative advantage shifts in the course of economic development.  
This is also why industrialisation in the first stage must be based on agriculture.  
Continuous improvements in agricultural productivity then open up opportunities for 
migration out of agriculture and diversifying industrial development, particular via 
small- and medium-sized enterprises.  Several fast growing industrialising Asian 
countries, such as China, Malaysia, Thailand, even India are following this path.  And 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and some other industrial countries have previously had 
rapid agricultural development as a pre-condition for industrial development.  The   11 
case of Japan which had its agricultural revolution in the period 1863-1912, which 
laid a sound basis for industrial development, is well documented (Yujiro Hayami et 
al., 1975).  In all these cases, agricultural development was based on science and 
technology, not custom and traditional ways of production. 
The critical role of agriculture and agricultural development, leading to rural poverty 
reduction, at the first stages of economic development, is nevertheless often poorly 
understood.  The critical role of agricultural development can only be well 
appreciated if one takes into account the following: 
- the comparative advantage of the agricultural sector 
- the capacity of the agricultural sector and agri-industries to absorb large amounts of 
labour (as a parking ground for later industrialization) - no other sector can do 
likewise 
- the labour-intensive character of agriculture and agri-industries for modest 
investments 
- availability of adapted technologies at relatively low cost 
- agriculture produces food crops which are at the basis of livelihood security 
- the broad based income generation effects, and multiplier effects, which the 
agricultural sector brings.  Agricultural growth is almost always equitable (except 
maybe plantation agriculture) and often favours women, particularly in food 
production and  -processing.  A large number of people share in its benefits.  
Agricultural growth is thus high quality growth and the quality of growth matters a 
lot.  Growth in other sectors of the economy is also important, but it carries a much 
larger risk of increasing inequalities and resulting in uneven development, with a 
small number of people capturing most of the benefits.  This can be said to be low 
quality growth.  Agricultural growth means assets accumulation by large numbers 
of smallholders, increased productivities and expanding incomes for many, and it is 
usually sustainable 
- agricultural growth very much determines economic growth in sub-Saharan 
countries, as such growth creates market opportunities for other sectors, directly or 
indirectly.  Agriculture must thus be the engine of growth at the present stage of 
development 
- high quality growth is sustainable and PRO-poor, PRO-women and PRO-
environment.   12 
Most developed countries have no comparative advantage in their agricultural sector, 
which usually employs only 2 -5% of the active population.  Because labour is 
expensive, capital investment in agriculture is very high, and as a result, also 
agricultural productivity.  But typically incomes in agriculture lag far behind those in 
the other sectors of the economy ("the income disparity gap").  And because farmers 
are well organized, and have strong lobbies, they receive protection and large 
subsidies from their governments. 
The total public support for agriculture in OECD-countries now amounts to about 
one billion USD per day
2.  And because of positive protection and export subsidies 
from the industrialised countries, poor developing countries suffer in the realization of 
their agricultural development and comparative advantage.  That "rich" countries 
support the incomes of their farmers can be seen as their business, but that they also 
give production-tied (coupled) subsidies and subsidize exports, and operate barriers 
for agricultural imports from poor countries, and thus make it very difficult for poor 
countries to lead an agricultural export-led economic growth strategy is shameful and 
unethical.  Lack of access to rich countries' markets is crucial for poor countries to 
develop economically.  For this reason, initiatives such as the European Union's 
"Everything - but - arms" for the very poorest countries, which eliminates all barriers 
on imports, need to be expanded to all poor developing countries where agricultural 
development is their ticket out of rural poverty.  Moreover, the transition period for 
sensitive products, presently up to 2006 for bananas and up to 2009 for rice and sugar 
appears quite long and unnecessary. 
One also needs to recognize that poor agricultural performance in the past does not 
exclude rapid spurs of agricultural growth in the future, e.g. the Green Revolution in 
India in the late sixties and seventies.  Moreover, there are success stories in 
agricultural performance in sub-Saharan Africa, e.g. cotton in West Africa, (e.g. Mali 
produces 600.000 ton, Benin over 400.000 ton), cocoa in Côte d'Ivoire (40% of world 
production), rice production in the Office du Niger in Mali, onions in Niger, cassava 
in Nigeria, cut flowers in Kenya, etc..  And all these successes point to favourable 
                                                 
2  This contrasts sharply with total ODA-development aid which is around 55 billion USD per year.  
Out of the total OECD-countries support for agriculture - 362 billion USD (or 1.4% of GDP) about 
80-90 billion USD goes to export subsidies, undermining the ability of developing countries to 
compete effectively on world agricultural markets.   13 
investment- and marketing conditions, a large public supportive role, and the 
importance o f agricultural research, technology development, extension, input 
delivery and credit
3. 
According to Nicholas Stern (2002), chief economist at the World Bank, the 
investment climate  - which leads to growth, and  empowerment  - which leads to 
poverty reduction, particularly via education (of women), social protection (safety 
net) and inclusion in social organizations, are the pillars for a strategy for pro-poor 
growth. 
It is only now that it is generally acknowledged that growth can only be truly 
sustainable w hen poverty is explicitly taken into account.  And there is no viable 
alternative for rural poverty reduction than smallholder development as an engine of 
income growth. 
 
5.  Why do the rural poor matter and the nature of their poverty 
5.1.  The nature of rural poverty 
One out of five of the world inhabitants - about 1.2 billion people - live in extreme 
poverty.  This is now commonly understood as living with less than one dollar a day
4. 
Their poverty is not only a condition of low income, low consumption and lack of 
assets.  It is above all a condition of vulnerability, exclusion and powerlessness
5 
which the lack of assets entails.  More than two thirds of them are in Asia; South Asia 
alone accounts for nearly half of them.  About one fourth is in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and this share is expected to increase. 
Poverty is largely a rural phenomenon
6  - some 900 million people  - 75% of the 
world's 1.2 billion extremely poor - live in rural areas. In sub-Sahara Africa, it is 80%. 
                                                 
3  IFPRI is presently documenting agricultural success stories in sub-Saharan Africa. 
4  The "standard" dollar-a-day poverty threshold is commonly used for international comparisons.  This 
poverty line adjusts for differences across countries and times in Purchasing-Power-Parities (PPP).  
At this line, a person obtains a "global consumption bundle" worth USD 1 per person per day in 
constant purchasing power of 1993.  For more on the measurement of poverty, identifying the poor 
and adding the numbers up, we refer to IFAD (2001), pp. 18-20. 
5  Throughout this paper, references are made to the following IFAD publications: IFAD, March 2002, 
Enabling the Rural Poor to Overcome their Poverty, Rome; IFAD, 2001, Rural Poverty Report 2001 
- The Challenge of Ending Rural Poverty, Rome; IFAD, 2001, Assessment of Rural Poverty, 
Western and Central Africa, and: 2002, Eastern and Southern Africa, Rome. 
6  The definition of rural as opposed to urban is important in the measurement of rural poverty.  
National distinctions between rural and urban are arbitrary and varied (see IFAD (2001), pp. 17-18).    14 
Rural poverty reduction must therefore be given priority if the Millennium 
Development Goals, particularly the one relating to poverty, are to be met. 
There is quite an academic debate whether poverty has reduced or increased over the 
last two decades (Deaton, June 2002).  Two recent World Bank reports came to 
different conclusions on the evolution of poverty, on the basis of the same data set, 
but different analytical methods (World Bank, 2001a) (World Bank, 2001b).  And 
both reports are truthful - poverty has lightly progressed from 1987 to 1998, and has 
considerably regressed from 1980 to 1998.  It all depends on how poverty is measured 
in China and India.  More than one-fourth of the poor in the world live in India. 
According to Shaohua Chen and Martin Ravallion (2000), more than 200 million 
people in China have been lifted out of poverty during the last two decades.  Part of 
the problem is one of measurement on the basis of household surveys, or on the basis 
of the national accounts of a country.  Also, the World Bank is the only global 
institution publishing original estimates of the number of poor in the world. 
For the purposes of this paper, it suffices to state that for most of sub-Saharan Africa, 
except for a few countries such as Ethiopia and Uganda, there has been little poverty 
reduction since the late 1970s, but a fall in the exceptionally high ratio's of rural to 
urban poverty.  Often some reduction in rural poverty is accompanied by increased 
urban poverty as rural poor have moved to cities, without finding employment and 
income there.  In contrast, successful rural poverty reduction usually works by raising 
the productivity of the poor, while most urban poverty alleviation efforts are social 
welfare-oriented.  Moreover, rural poverty alleviation may reduce migration, thus 
helping to reduce urban poverty of the future. 
It is now recognized that for some farming systems in marginal, resource poor areas, 
the best strategy may still be to move to other, better endowed areas or cities.  This is 
now, for the first time, explicitly recognized in FAO's pioneering study on the link 
between farming systems and rural poverty (see John Dixon, 2002)
7. 
                                                                                                                                            
The most common definition of the borderline is 5.000 persons, but it is 10.000 ore more, as in 
Nigeria, or it depends on various characteristics, as in Brazil and China.  We explicitly recognize the 
importance of peri-urban agriculture ("rural in an urban setting") and the increasing difficulty of 
distinguishing between rural and urban. 
7  http://www/fao.org/ag/magazine/GFSS.pdf   15 
Poverty is not an intrinsic attribute of people, but a product of livelihood systems and 
the socio-political forces that shape them. 
There is chronic and transient poverty, and they may demand different remedies.  A 
household is chronically poor if its mean income is below the poverty line, while a 
household is transitorily poor if its mean income is above the poverty line but its 
annual income falls below the poverty line at least once during the period of analysis. 
There are intimate links between rural poverty, food security and agricultural 
development.  Most rural people find their livelihood in agriculture, directly or 
indirectly.  Agriculture is also the principal source of savings, taxes (mainly at export) 
and public finance.  Most sub-Saharan countries, with a few exceptions (Nigeria, 
Botswana, South Africa, …), at the present stage of their development, are really 
agricultural states.  But agriculture is typically poorly performing, under-capitalized 
and not really competitive at the international level.  Agricultural growth is only 2% 
per year for 25 African countries, and 4% in 17 other. 
"Agriculture" is to be understood here in its broadest sense, comprising crop and 
animal production, fisheries, forests and upstream and downstream sectors: agri-
business, the agri-food chain and transformation/processing of agricultural products.  
It includes smallholder- and peasant farm production as well a s large plantation 
agriculture in the forest belt.  Agricultural development must thus be seen in the 
context of an emerging value-adding chain and industrial development rooted in 
agriculture.  The point in all this is to strengthen what rural people consider essential 
in improving their livelihood entitlement, including non-agricultural activities where 
these are relevant and viable. 
 
5.2.  Why do the rural poor matter? 
As poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is mainly a rural phenomenon, the rural poor really 
matter in agricultural development and, by extension, in overall economic 
development.  Experiences are that the poor, when given economic opportunities, 
seize on it and respond to economic incentives.  This has been shown time and again, 
and warrants the focus on the rural poor as the foundation of economic growth and 
development.  As the poor respond eagerly to economic incentives, they are efficient 
with the resources and technology at hand, save whenever they have a chance and pay   16 
back credit on schedule.  This has been confirmed in Grameen bank type credit 
schemes in Africa and proves that poor rural people are creditworthy risks and in the 
end, a good investment.  But because there are so many rural poor, and because the 
amounts involved per person or household are so small and the poor lack collateral, 
administration costs can add up.  This is why a local, decentralised approach is needed 
and why commercial banks, usually located in cities, are usually not interested in 
lending to them. 
Lifting the rural poor out of their poverty, breaking the poverty circle, through 
investments in their basic capital stock (physical, human, social) thus appears as 
sound economic strategy with the added advantage that such economic growth is high 
quality growth and by definition broad-based and equitable.  But that lending to the 
poor is potentially a wise investment is often not acknowledged. 
But rising out of poverty is no guarantee against falling back into poverty.  Civil strife 
and war, natural disasters, financial crises, migration and degrading natural resources 
disproportionately increase the insecurity and instability of the rural poor.  Thus, 
assets stand central in the ability to withstand shocks and cope with vulnerability.  
And it is the access to assets and free markets that matters. 
According priority to the rural poor means taking on the challenges of a world that is 
rapidly transforming, and assuring that the rural poor are not left behind.  Global 
interdependence, decentralization and rapid development of c ivil-society 
organizations present many opportunities, provided the rural poor can influence the 
institutions, policies and decisions that affect their lives.  As things stand, the rural 
poor rarely choose or control the conditions under which they earn their livelihoods.  
And among the highly diversified poor rural populations, one significant group stands 
out: women.  The majority of women still remain economically and politically 
marginalized, although their contributions to the resilience of rural households and 
their potential as agents of change have been acknowledged. 
We must therefore recognize that gaining control over major decisions that affect his 
or her welfare (empowerment) is a key element of human dignity for any individual.  
Thus, lack of access to assets and lack of reflection of the interests of the rural poor in 
key political, economic and institutional processes  - lack of empowerment  - go 
together.  Both together are the immediate causes of rural poverty.  The problems of   17 
the rural poor are very often paternalistically viewed as existing somehow outside the 
basic framework of market competitiveness and asset accumulation  - as being not 
rational persons or not motivated by income (as was often the case in the colonial 
period).  In fact, it is precisely their lack of assets (five types of capital) that does not 
entitle them to livelihood security. 
 
6.  The decline in international financing for agricultural development 
International financing for agricultural development declined by nearly 40% from 
1988 to 1998 and is at an all time low as share of overall development aid.  This 
contrasts sharply with the centrality of agriculture as the primary livelihood for the 
rural poor.  Why then have so many donors turned away from agriculture and rural 
development?  Even in the World Bank sponsored Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSP), the agricultural sector is downplayed. 
The World Bank lending is a case in point: in 1999-2000, only 8,5% of lending in 
sub-Saharan Africa was spent on agriculture, as against 21,2% in the 1985-89 period 
(IFAD, 2001, p. 26).  For most donors, the decline in agriculture's share reflects the 
increased importance attached to social services and social and economic 
infrastructure development.  It also reflects the view by some that the establishment of 
appropriate policy frameworks, which will induce private investments, will 
sufficiently raise agricultural productivity and alleviate poverty.  This is however 
doubtful. 
Many donors are of the opinion that there were too many  failures - non-performing 
projects - in agricultural and rural development, and that therefore new approaches are 
needed.  This often results in more tied aid and less aid for public institutions and 
public services.  The impression gathered is that we are back to trickle-down theory, 
and that rural poverty, which is overwhelmingly a rural phenomenon, is being 
attacked not via investments in its core activity, but via other, indirect activities, or at 
the macro-economic level.  Granted that policy improvements are important, to be 
effective they need to be accompanied by investments in the sector most concerned, 
either public or private.  The declining support for agriculture is thus extremely 
damaging to efforts to reduce poverty and hunger. 
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7.  Agricultural development and poverty alleviation - important lessons learned 
- what works? 
After more than a decade of structural adjustment (SAP) and economic liberalization 
in sub-Saharan Africa, in the face of declining donor support for agriculture and the 
rural  sectors, and renewed emphasis on poverty reduction and locally based 
development initiatives (e.g. NEPAD), important lessons have been learned. 
Hereafter follows a list, which largely reflects a personal assessment: 
- trickle-down does not work for rural poverty reduction.  Rapid economic growth in 
one sector of the economy (e.g. mining, forestry exports, oil production) usually 
does not affect the poor.  Attacking rural poverty requires broad based economic 
growth (e.g. smallholder agricultural development) and specific targeted actions for 
the poor (e.g. micro-credit focused on women) 
- reduced public expenditures, such as a result of SAP, affect first of all the poor, 
because of increased health and education costs, and other (unaffordable) public 
services.  A public social protection safety net targeted at the poor is absolutely 
necessary.  But targeting is difficult, and without targeting the costs may become 
prohibitive.  But it is more important that the very poor are reached, than that some 
non-poor also benefit from the scheme (which is unavoidable) 
- many African governments are reluctant to face-up straightforward to the poor.  
They are still largely hidden, unacknowledged and without power.  The usual focus 
is still on the productive, educated, urban-based, male, assertive part of the 
population.  Giving the poor a voice, incorporation in public programs, 
empowerment etc. (livelihood entitlement) is all too often left to NGOs and is not a 
public concern.  Also, the development potential of the poor, their capacity to save 
and invest (very small sums) and to contribute to economic development is still 
largely ignored.  This also extends to university level courses in economic 
development in African universities which often fail to address poverty, poverty 
assessment and poverty reduction (as a subject, not as a by-product of economic 
growth).  The focus on poverty is still too much a concern of northern donors and 
international institutions.  There are a few exceptions: Uganda, Ghana, South 
Africa,… 
  "How does it affect the poor?" should be one of the most frequently asked questions 
in ministries, but unfortunately it is not.  Too many decision makers are content   19 
with a statement that "… it will also benefit the poor" (ultimately  - via trickle 
down).  Prioritising public investments by taking account of their direct incidence 
on the poor, knowing that one dollar of income more for the poor has much greater 
weight than one dollar more for the average citizen, should become standard 
operating procedure if poverty alleviation is to be taken seriously 
- agricultural development requires incentives (favourable prices) and publicly 
supported agricultural services and institutions: agricultural research and extension; 
agricultural education; input supply (e.g. seeds) to the extent that the private sector 
is not performing; agricultural credit, particularly micro-finance were private banks 
are non-performing; marketing infrastructure, in particular roads, communication, 
transport.  The critical role of the government in agricultural development is often 
poorly understood. 
- labour, particularly as it affects women in agriculture, is often a major constraint on 
agricultural performance.  Animal traction, also in transport, small-scale post 
harvest operations (drying, milling, processing) and rural water supply (pumps) can 
go a long way in alleviating the burden on women. NGOs can play and play a major 
role in this respect 
- most agricultural research is "scale-positive" in the sense that the outcome of 
research is more quickly and readily available to the large-scale farmers who have 
better access to the requisite information, resources and credit (Evans, 1998).  
Research on the impact of the Green Revolution showed that larger farmers initially 
gained the most, but even the smallest farmers eventually gained too, while the 
urban poor profited the most from the greater availability and lower real prices of 
their staple foods.  Nevertheless, research for innovations of specific advantage to 
the poor farmers has often failed, or was not a success, or more endowed farmers 
took most of the advantage 
- often stability in yields, and less risk, is more important for the rural poor than 
higher yields per se.  There is still great potential in improved varieties - resistant to 
pests, improved crop rotations, fallow management with legume crops, small doses 
of organic and inorganic fertilizers for integrated soil fertility management.  And 
wrapping up fertility and pest resistance in the seed rather than in agrochemicals, if 
feasible, helps sustainable management of natural resources.  Thus, pro-poor, 
sustainable technical progress should, besides yield enhancement and labour-
intensity, also seek robustness, resilience and stability   20 
- in the economic liberalization and free trade environment of today, poor farmers are 
more fully exposed to the demands of markets and vulnerable to their volatility.  But 
market access is often difficult because of low population densities in rural areas, 
remoteness from centres and high transport costs.  These are real physical barriers in 
accessing markets.  And giving better access to markets for the rural poor is often 
costly and difficult, particularly in remote or enclave areas 
- economic liberalization and private sector development have increased "efficiency" 
in the economy, but the benefits are usually very unevenly spread, and most of the 
poor do not benefit.  Free market economics does not necessarily lead to more 
equity, equitable income distribution, equal opportunity or better access to vital 
public services.  Often, to the contrary!  Private monopolies are also far worse than 
public monopolies.  Minimal public services (education, health, transport, credit, 
input supply) are needed for addressing rural poverty.  These services can be 
provided by private entities, but there must be a minimal public financing and 
control.  Because targeting is difficult, often nothing (public) is done 
-  a conducive policy environment, good governance and thus good public 
management is now more and more recognized as a necessary condition (but not 
sufficient) for aid to really work.  Burnside and Dollar (1997 and 1998) have shown 
with panel data that aid spurs economic growth only in a good, conducive policy 
environment.  Moreover, in countries with relatively  good management, aid has a 
powerful effect on reducing infant mortality.  There is no effect in countries with 
weak economic management - evidenced by poor property rights, high corruption, 
closed trade regimes, and macroeconomic instability.  And in such  countries, 
development projects promoted by donors tend to fail. 
 
8.  Increasing livelihood entitlement, how it relates to agriculture 
"Hunger anywhere threatens peace everywhere" (M.S. Swaminathan, 1994).  "Poverty 
and deprivation are seen as underlying causes of endemic conflict and civil violence" 
(The Bruntland Commission, 1987).  Much of the deprivation is rural, with seven out 
of ten of the world's poor (less than 1 USD income per day) living in rural areas. 
According to FAO, the number of undernourished has been declining by 6 million a 
years since the 1996 WFS.  This is far from the target which is now at 22 million per 
year.  Few countries, and particularly China, have significantly improved since 1990   21 
their food security while the majority of the poor countries, particularly in Sub-
Sahara Africa, have suffered deterioration. 
Conflicts are fuelled by poverty inequality and discrimination.  What triggers revolt is 
not only "absolute" but "relative" poverty as well.  The "conscience" of inequality has 
risen with globalization, particularly the mass-media.  Many have-nots now identify 
inequality with injustice.  International inequality has dramatically increased the gap 
between the richest and poorest regions of the world. 
Increasing livelihood entitlement implies creating and enhancing the five types of 
capital or assets that persons have (recapitalisation of rural areas).  It is only through a 
better asset base that higher sustainable incomes will be derived and that vulnerability 
to shocks will be reduced.  It also means that people's opportunity costs for joining a 
local rebel group or militia is increased, which makes it less likely as people have 
more to lose.  If the quality of life in rural areas improves,  fewer conflicts will 
emerge. 
Poverty thus is linked to frustrated capabilities due to asset deprivation, inability to 
afford decent health and education and lack of power .  Low consumption is only one 
dimension; others are malnutrition, illiteracy, low life expectancy, insecurity, 
powerlessness a nd low self-esteem.  Poverty is multidimensional and therefore 
poverty reduction efforts must be multi-targeted - they must encompass economic, 
social, political and institutional factors.  This makes poverty alleviation a most 
difficult task, if one aims at sustainably lifting the poor out of poverty. 
Agricultural change can work to reduce poverty, but only when linked to social 
changes that give the poor greater power over the social factors that determine their 
livelihoods.  Thus, the answer to rural poverty is not just agriculture, although this is a 
big part of the story.  Equally important are empowerment and a favourable 
investment climate, also for the poor, which  create an enabling environment and 
incentives.  The main challenge is to enable the rural poor in helping themselves out 
of poverty through increased access to resources (assets), markets and institutions.  
This is a daunting task.  If we fail, we will have in a decade or less a major focus on 
urban poverty, as the rural poor will have undoubtedly moved to the cities, where 
welfare services are usually better.  But the rural poor offer much better prospects in 
economic self-sustaining, equitable development (quality economic growth) through   22 
agricultural and rural non-farm (often farm related) productive activities.  Once they 
join the urban poor, it becomes more difficult to put them on a sustainable path out of 
poverty, as they may settle in an urban welfare safety net, even if there are big holes 
in it and if it is far from adequate.  If we don't lift the rural poor out of their precarious 
situation over the next decade, the task awaiting the international community may be 
even more daunting and impossible.  This is why a PRO-poor, PRO-women, PRO-
environment approach to agricultural development is so important. 
Agricultural development, as part of economic and social changes that give the poor 
greater power over the productive resources and the social factors that shape their 
livelihoods, is indispensable to the enhanced food security of the rural population and 
to a more peaceful and stable environment.  Equitable growth and pro-poor policies 
are critical not only to prevent the outbreak of conflicts but also in the immediate 
post-conflict situations (FAO-WFS-5 years later, 2002). 
 
9.  The way forward 
In poor countries, lack of agricultural development is closely linked to rural poverty.  
And such poverty, which also implies low opportunity costs of people, makes them 
prime candidates for joining rebel groups or engaging in local civil conflicts.  When 
you have nothing to lose, anything is better than scavenging everyday for the means 
of survival.  But the links between agricultural development, rural poverty, destitution 
and local conflicts are usually complex and loose.  Other factors intervene such as 
agrarian structures, the presence of (point) lootable income, ethnic strive and poor 
governance.  Violent conflicts can only last for some time when they are viable, i.e. 
when they find a favourable seedbed for their emergence and spread. 
But the  literature also  teaches us that in the not so poor countries, particular 
conditions may also give rise to civil conflicts.  In particular, lootable resources 
(minerals, perennial crops, cattle, etc.) in the presence of gross inequities (ethnic 
discrimination, income inequality, political repression, lack of due process, etc.) can 
also lead to internal armed conflicts.  Growing income and wealth disparities are 
breeding grounds for violence and conflict.  There is only so much in terms of 
inequity that people can tolerate.   23 
The recent history of Côte d'Ivoire, a not so poor West African country, often called 
the elephant of West Africa, illustrates what can happen when large income and 
wealth inequalities (between the South and the North of the country) are coupled with 
political discrimination of long time residents of foreign origin.  What was once 
considered a beacon of political stability and an economic success story, a model for 
other countries, has evolved into a situation of continuing internal conflict and 
instability.  The lootable resources here are perennial crops, in particular cocoa (40% 
of world production) and coffee plantations, palmoil and rubber and bananas.  The 
uncertainty of land tenure regarding in particular the cocoa plantations, when most of 
the recent plantations were established by immigrant Malinke residents, and the 
refusal to grant them citizenship, has certainly created the seedbed for internal 
conflict. 
It is thus clear that agricultural development in a poor country is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition.  Such development must also be broad based and equitable, with 
all sharing in it, and good governance in a broad sense.  This includes security of 
property rights, broad based and transparent participation in political decision making, 
a stable regulatory framework and reliable public institutions.  These constitute the 
sufficient conditions which will minimize the chances of internal conflict.  But it is 
often difficult to institute such conditions, as a particular class of decision makers 
often has economic interest in maintaining exploitative conditions and impunity.  
Only pressure from below, a drive toward equity and democratic process can change 
the power structure and asset ownership.  In a democratic process, changes are usually 
slow but incremental.  In a conflict mode process, especially if it is armed, changes 
can be made very quick as such changes occur under force, but it is always doubtful 
whether such changes are durable or sustainable.  The way forward is certainly 
agricultural and rural development in poor, conflict prone countries, but such 
development must be broad based and equitable, in an institutional framework that 
ensures asset security and a voice in political decision making ("good governance" in 
a broad sense).  Only then can livelihood security be enhanced in a sustainable way 
and can the probability of internal conflicts arising locally be minimized.  In this way, 
poor people acquire livelihood entitlement, i.e. a strong enough capital base (physical, 
financial, natural, social, human) to weather shocks and to ensure minimal living 
conditions (basic needs) at all times.   24 
Epilogue 
Development economists, poverty economists a.o. so far have largely neglected the 
link between agriculture and peace.  Conflict and violence, including war is largely 
outside their expertise.  It seems like an "inevitable" event, when all else fails.  
Moreover, the possible link between agricultural development, food security and 
peace is largely neglected and poorly understood. 
In an era where the "war on terrorism" dominates international public policy and 
international relations, and where potential conflict, violence and war are at the centre 
of public attention, it is time the link between agriculture and peace is recognized and 
properly understood.  Agriculture is an obvious focus for conflict prevention. 
Invariably, the economic cost of violence and war is very high and far outweighs the 
cost of agricultural development and peace.  This needs to be better studied and 
recognized by policy makers and politicians.  "No peace without development and no 
development without peace" should be the leitmotiv of development economists, 
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Case Study 
Agricultural Policy, Crop Failure and the "Ruriganiza" Famine (1989) in 




K.U.Leuven, Leuven, June 2002 
 
In the second half of the eighties, Rwanda entered a period of economic decline.  
Food production per capita declined, low coffee and tea prices, unfavourable weather 
conditions, unsolved refugee questions, demographic growth, mounting corruption 
and political unrest characterised this period.  With the fall of the Berlin wall, western 
donors began to demand democratization, also in Rwanda.  On top of a drought and a 
local crop failure in 1989 came a rebel invasion from Uganda in late 1990.  These 
rebels were the offspring of the 1959 Tutsi refugees who had not been allowed to 
return to Rwanda.  The government argued that Rwanda did not have enough land to 
settle the former refugees which were mainly cattle-herders. 
In the subsequent years, Rwanda experienced a growing demand for democratization 
both from opposition parties within the country, from the donor community and from 
the rebels.  From 1990 to 1993 a series of battles occurred between the rebels and the 
government forces, the latter winning these battles with the support of French 
paratroops.  A peace agreement was signed in Arusha in 1993.  Hard core leading 
party supporters however did not accept power sharing with the rebels and had 
already begun preparing large scale massacres of the civilian Tutsi population from 
the beginning of the civil war.  The ensuing genocide took place in 1994. 
The Ruriganiza famine was not a real famine in the sense that thousands of people 
died from hunger.  Rather, it was a prolonged period in which a serious food crisis 
broke down the fabric of society, a creeping agricultural crisis, the result of several 
years of  hardship in which households had depleted their resources and could not 
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cope anymore with another crop failure.  Many families migrated to other areas in 
Rwanda and abroad. 
Several reports published by a research team from Michigan State University show a 
clear and dramatic decline in yields of all major crops between 1984 and 1991 
(Byiringiro, F. and T. Reardon, 1996).  Over this period, per capita food production 
dropped by 25%.  The driving force behind declining land productivity, soil erosion 
and declining per capita incomes is population growth.  Platteau (2000) stated that for 
Rwanda "… population growth has reached extremely high levels without giving rise 
to major technical progress susceptible of providing a decent livelihood to the 
growing number of people living on the land", in opposition to the Boserupian model 
of population-induced agricultural intensification. 
The Rwandan government did not react to the crop failure; it did not provide food or 
other aid and thus allowed a crop failure to develop into a famine.  The refusal to 
accept that famine struck Southern Rwanda had everything to do with the ruling 
principle of food self-sufficiency.  The non response to famine was to allow a 
Malthusian final solution to happen, namely to equilibrate population with resources.  
Acknowledging that famine existed would have been the same as saying that Rwanda 
could not feed itself, the latter being the cornerstone of President Habyarimana's 
regime.  The government thus refused to acknowledge that its policy h ad failed.  A 
second reason for the regime to passively allow the population to starve was that the 
people living in the famine struck region had never been in favour of the President, 
who was from the North of the country.  A third reason was that the famine-struck 
prefecture Gikongoro and parts of Butare had a large Tutsi population. 
Famine only occurs when governments allow it to take place.  This is what happened 
in Rwanda in 1989.  Once all the land was put into cultivation, peasants were unable 
to keep food production and population growth in balance because insufficient 
attention was paid 
to technological innovation, fertilizer use, credit and market development.  In any 
case, the story of the crop failure in southern Rwanda, and the strategy of preventing 
food aid, gives ample evidence that the government knowingly allowed famine to 
occur.  This process created the seedbed for genocide.  The famine that occurred in 
two prefectures in the South caused the emigration of 10.000 citizens to Burundi and   27 
Tanzania, of which many Tutsi.  Traditionally, Tutsi are cattle-keepers and the 
government in its drive for self-sufficiency conducted an anti-pastoral policy.  A 
pastoral way of life had become impossible in Rwanda.  This is why the government 
also did not allow Tutsi's living abroad to return to their country. 
The genocide which occurred in 1994 had been the subject of many studies by 
genocide scholars.  All agree that many factors have intervened, but it is argued in 
particular that more attention should be given to study the links between famine and 
genocide.  Genocide is obviously the most extreme form of internal conflict.  In the 
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